The Divinity of God and the Humanity

But the problem is rattling that his continued use of Biblical language partially conceals the decimal point to which his theology departs from the substance of the Christian faith. For his writings are fill with terms that, if the preceding analysis is correct, can have no meaning whatsoever beyond the purely metaphorical (Griffin, 1990, p. 36).

?IP0,0?On this examine, Tillich's approach complicates the already difficult task of increasing keen human understanding of the divine. Griffin appears to find unpersuasive the facet that Tillich's theological language is meant to be symbolic, especially in view of Tillich's referring to matinee idol's "'hearing' our prayers, and his 'accepting' us. Despite the situation that God is not a assailable, or a self in any sense, Tillich speaks of his 'point of view,' of his 'image' of our fulfillment, and of his being 'a subject even where he seems to be an object'" (Griffin, 1990, p. 36). This analysis leads to the view that such(prenominal) language prevents reaching interpretative religious meaning. "The notorious case is Tillich's position that we must be able to think of God in a certain way for religious purposes, entirely that of course God is really nothing like that. This implies a violent split between our cognitive and religious dimensions, precisely the type of split that Tillich was most concerned to avoid" (Griffin, 1990, p. 38). To set apart it another way, Christians are both condemned to the p

This leads to Tillich's adoption of " dialecticalal union of acceptance and rejection [of non-Christian religions], with all the tensions, uncertainties, and changes which such dialectics implies" (Tillich, 1963, p. 30). In Systematic Theology, Tillich also refers to philosophical realism in the Hegelian methodological tradition, which "presupposes that reality itself moves through with(predicate) 'yes' and 'no,' through electropositive, negative, and positive again. . . . the logical expression of a philosophy of life, for life moves through self-affirmation, going out of itself and returning to itself" (Tillich, ST I, p. 234). This attitude is what we have called the dialectic of inclusion, in association with Tillich's correlational method.

Based on Tillich's induce elaboration and critique of Christianity by way of theological correlation, it is to the field and structure of Tillich's dialogue with non-Christian religions to which we may now turn.

The Western mindset, whether mystifying or rational in emphasis, is one reason that it has been native to deal with Tillich's understanding of Christianity before treating of Tillich's dialogue with non-Christian religions. As Tillich himself notes, a Christian critique of Christianity must proceed from "the event on which Christianity is based, and . . . the participation in the continuing spiritual power of this event, which is the air and reception of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ" (Tillich, 1963, p. 79). We have seen that Tillich's correlational method is programmatically an attribute of that statement. As for the Christian encounter with non-Christian religions, Tillich says that the insert of Christianity "implies the rejection of their claims insofar as they contradict the Christian principle, implicitly or explicitly" (Tillich, 1963, p. 29). To the degree the statement reflects Tillich's honest views, it stamps him as a man of faith. Yet neither Tillich's own faith nor the fact of rejection or negation is decisive. What is
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